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At a time when citizens must rely on their state to tackle the urgent threats of global warming, a pandemic, and destabilizing inequality, critics both left and right would tear it down. Libertarian opponents denounce the exercise of agency discretion as illiberal, unconstitutional and obnoxious to the rule of law. They argue that regulatory agencies violate the separation of powers and thus defy the principle of limited government. Moreover, agencies’ particularized, discretionary forms of regulation offend the liberal commitment to universalism, generality and neutrality. Their favored solution, a strict application of the non-delegation doctrine, would create a new, undemocratic separation of powers problem: ascribing to unelected judges responsibility for economic and social regulation. On the other hand, conservatives with a more authoritarian inflection would rescue agencies from their constitutional exile by placing them under more direct executive control. Hoping to bootstrap agencies to the president’s democratic legitimacy, their solution carries alarming Schmittian implications.
Yet administration fares little better in the hands of democratic theorists. They blame it for a variety of social and political ailments: the reification of social differences and the juridification of human nature (Habermas, 1971); regulatory capture; the depoliticization of the economy and the subsidization of globalized financial capitalism; and, ultimately, the constellation of populist politics currently threatening liberal democratic states. Their solution is democratization. For the most part, political theorists take an “agency instrumentalist” view that echoes libertarian critiques: agencies, as fiduciaries, must, like a “roi-machine,” (Condorcet) robotically carry out the will of the popular sovereign as expressed by legislatures. Preventing the delegation of policymaking to flexible, expert agencies, they would deprive citizens of the ability to carry out the laws they jointly create for themselves. More recently, theorists like Blake Emerson and Sabeel Rahman argue for agency democratization. Yet their ideas risk corporatism and are perhaps too sanguine about the possibility of rational democratic consensus.
This paper will put administration on firmer constitutional, democratic footing. Drawing from recent literature on sovereignty skepticism (e.g., Canovan, Morgan, Grimm), representative democracy (e.g., Saward, Dovi, Mansbridge, Urbinati), and legal theory (e.g., Leiter; Holmes, Jr.; Shklar; Moyn; Vermuele), it argues that critiques of the administrative state rely upon mistaken notions of popular sovereignty and the rule of law. First, they posit the law as the “will” of an organ-body democratic sovereign that is transcribed (however ham-handedly) by elected officials. For example, liberal theorists argue that congress, if deliberating properly, should replicate the volunte general by promulgating simple, general laws that aspire to universalism. (Rosanvallon, 2018; The Federalist) Yet, as recent theory shows, there is no exogenous democratic will to transcribe – not, at least, if we are to avoid populism or worse. (E.g., Lefort; Saward; Urbinati) Second, they posit that this law can be straightforwardly and noncontroversially applied by neutral judges and administrators. They thus understand the rule of law as a principle that only abstract, general laws applied unwaveringly can ensure political equality. Yet critical and theorists of democracy, economy, race and gender show that the application of abstract law to concrete cases may exacerbate inequality. Only by treating different cases differently can political equality be redeemed. Moreover, legal realists demonstrate that law is always underdeterminate; unelected judges and administrators will inevitably find themselves smuggling outside values into their decision-making. They do not, and cannot, merely “call balls and strikes.”
But by considering them as part of representative government, administrative agencies can regain constitutional, democratic credentials. If democracy aspires not to universal consent and a formalist understanding of the rule of law, but instead to democratic autonomy (Urbinati & Warren, 2008), it is at least possible that administration can be incorporated into a system that promises to give citizens an equal role to play in creating the laws that govern them. Indeed, agencies already serve as fora for representative politics as citizens organize around notice and comment rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act. They also serve as representatives themselves. The EEOC and the CFPB, for example, give voice to minorities and the economically disadvantaged. By dispersing decision-making throughout different departments while also providing points of democratic entry into policymaking, independent executive agencies help constitutional democracies ensure that power can respond effectively to popular demands while always remaining an empty place. (Lefort)