How Does Violence Deter? Functional and Informational Effects of Repression

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Abstract

Previous work on the relationship between repression and dissent has mostly ignored the mechanisms through which repression affects dissent. In this paper, I distinguish two distinct channels through which repression can deter dissidents. First, repression used preemptively works through a direct, functional channel by reducing the opposition's capabilities. Second, the presence and the severity of preemptive repression provides information to its target about the capabilities of the government implementing it. I use a formal model to demonstrate how these two distinct channels interact, and how taken together they can change the likelihood, severity and, effect of repression. The model presented demonstrates how the informational and functional channels of repression are not simply additive or separable, and how the presence of asymmetric information can modify the effect of repression by incentivizing bluffing or honestly signaling strength through preemptive repression. In addition to explaining cases that have avoided existing theories, this model also points to novel challenges to observational work on repression and dissent nexus that have not been identified.

Author

• Dogus Aktan