Legislative Review and Obstruction in Coalitional Presidentialism

• In Event: Interbranch Relations in Latin America

Abstract

What explains the variation in legislative activities in the deliberation of bills and efforts to block them? Many “third wave” multiparty presidential democracies have outperformed the initial ominous predictions in terms of their durability, some by forming coalitional governments. With multiparty presidential systems’ endurance, the study of legislatures—a key institution of democracy—has become ever more important. This paper analyzes legislative activism and obstruction in a paradigmatic case of coalitional presidential systems—Brazil—by highlighting the roles of political negotiation within the governing coalition and the ideological proximity between the president and the president’s coalition partners.

The paper contends that heterogeneous governing coalitions make presidential coalition management more difficult, leading to more votes on the same bill, more scrutiny by committees, greater delays, and lesser likelihoods of executive proposals’ passage. The ideological gap between presidents and their coalitions further increases legislative reviews and dilatory movements on executive proposals. Moreover, the president-coalition ideological distance is expected to exert greater effects on legislative engagement and obstruction than the strength of the opposition or the ideological distance between the governing coalition and the legislative chamber.

An examination of legislative activities on executive proposals submitted to the Brazilian Congress indicates that while presidential coalition management through cabinet portfolio allocations is effective in reducing the congressional attempts to obstruct the legislative process and scrutinize executive proposals, a coalition composed of a large number of parties reduces the effectiveness of this governing tool. The analysis of executive proposals also shows some evidence that the ideological gap between the president’s party and the remaining coalition parties triggers greater legislative engagement in the content of government bills, leading to more legislative scrutiny and more floor votes on the same bill.

Author

• Taeko Hiroi, The University of Texas at El Paso