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Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s virtually unexamined novel, Benigna Machiavelli, responds to both Machiavelli’s Prince and H.G. Wells’ New Machiavelli. In it, Gilman lays out her feminist critique of patriarchal society, proposing instead a politics of care—albeit a care that uses Machiavellian means to assure its own goals.
In The New Machiavelli, H.G. Wells takes Machiavelli’s political theory, which he sees as deeply personal insofar as Machiavelli’s own vices and weaknesses are mixed into it, as a starting point. What Machiavelli misses though, according to Wells, is sex and love. In a semi-autobiographical novel, Wells lays out his own political theory informed by his life experience with sex and love, which he identifies as his vice: He advocates “The Endowment of Motherhood,” a eugenic approach to support the common good by understanding women bearing and raising children as a public service. Rather than being subordinated to an individual man, Wells believes women should be subordinated to the collective purpose. He calls himself a feminist, but he condescendingly critiques the women’s movement for suffrage. He sets himself up as a better feminist then women are.
Charlotte Perkins Gilman puts Wells in his place: In her review of The New Machiavelli, published in her magazine, The Forerunner, Gilman states that while she agrees with his ideas about the raising of children, his approach has the limitations of “masculine emotion and conduct.” She says that the women of his text are “mercilessly caricatured,” that “it is only sex in women which he sees, and for which he demands social recognition.”
Not only a critic, Gilman offers an alternative semi-autobiographical feminist riff on Machiavelli, Benigna Machiavelli. Unlike in Wells, where women are something to be protected, in Gilman’s work we see a woman who is capable of manipulating the social world around her in ways that improve it. The eponymous character, Benigna, is so named because she is a benign Machiavelli. Benigna uses power and control in the text to improve the world and work toward what she sees as the good of individuals and the common good. A true feminist, Benigna uses her cunning in order to work against patriarchy and empower women both domestically and socially. Much like The Prince, though, Gilman’s means to her end is through a tyrannical power that controls its subjects—until they learn what their good really is and can pursue it themselves.
Gilman’s response to Wells and to Machiavelli is crucial today for theorizing a political ethic of care: While care is a neglected aspect of political life—and one to which some strands of feminism have drawn our attention—the undemocratic nature of Gilman’s appropriation of Machiavelli highlights the excesses of care: Care can become a controlling and manipulating force, rather than one that builds agency. The weaknesses of Benigna’s approach lead astute readers to recognize the need for a democratic care, a care that builds thoroughly democratic power, rather than allowing the tyrant alone—and in Benigna’s case a tyrant whose intentional invisibility makes her more effective—to determine how to educate its subjects.