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Scholars of international relations such as Walt, Halliday, and Kissinger have long recognized revolutions as an important source of interstate conflict. Less attention has been paid to revolutionary coups, armed seizures of power that didn’t involve mass action but that elevated a new regime espousing a radical ideology. In this paper, I explore the similarities and differences between these coups and traditional revolutions in their effects on interstate conflict participation through an examination of one of the most famous revolutionary coups, that of the Free Officers in Egypt.
In my recent book on revolutionary war, I showed that there are two principle pathways through which revolutions can lead to interstate violence. The first is the disruptions they often produce to the borders and/or the apparent military strength of revolutionary states. These disruptions invite opportunistic challengers but the window of opportunity to exploit them is short-lived and thus the wars they produce occur soon after the revolution if they take place at all.
The second pathway is the ideological change produced by revolutions. In many cases revolutions replace a regime that was relatively content with the international status quo with a more revisionist one opposed to the dominant powers. The increase in interstate conflict this shift produces is less dramatic than the one stemming from perceived vulnerability but it lasts longer, persisting until the new regime ceases its challenge and is accepted as a “respectable” member of the international order.
Unlike traditional revolutions, revolutionary coups don’t produce significant internal disorder but they do lead to a similar change in ideology. Therefore, we would expect no major increase in interstate conflict in the immediate aftermath of such coups but a significant one in the longer run as the new government gets a chance to implement its revisionist foreign policy and other states react to that change.
This is precisely what happened in Egypt. The 1952 Free Officers Coup that overthrew the monarchy generated little of the international hostility that follows many traditional revolutions. However, it soon became clear that the regime of President Nasser was a revisionist one, friendly toward the Soviet Union, opposed to the conservative Arab monarchies, and most fatefully, eager for renewed confrontation with the new state of Israel. As a result, Egypt’s conflict participation soared over the next few decades, with the country experiencing increased participation in both militarized interstate disputes and full-scale wars until the signing of the Camp David Accords transformed it into a status quo power several decades later.
The pattern seen in the Egyptian case is reinforced by a briefer analysis of two other Middle Eastern revolutionary coups, namely those that took place in Libya and Iraq. In those countries the new, revisionist regimes also avoided an immediate surge in interstate conflict while seeing major increases in the longer term. Taken together, these cases confirm that the revolutionary coup is a significant phenomenon in terms of its impact on interstate conflict, one worthy of more extensive study than it has thus far received.