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Leader Strategy and Domestic Constraints in State Contributions of Peacekeepers

Sat, October 2, 4:00 to 5:30pm PDT (4:00 to 5:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

What role do leaders play in shaping state contributions of personnel to peacekeeping operations? While many studies consider the determinants of personnel commitments to peacekeeping, little work has addressed the internal workings of states’ political systems, assuming instead that states are unitary actors driven by broad, national-level factors such as economic status and regime type. Yet, variation exists in many states’ rates of involvement in peacekeeping missions over time, as well as across countries despite being very similar politically and economically. We argue that deployments are often shaped by leader preferences and domestic structural factors that enable or constrain those preferences. Specifically, we propose that variation in leader preferences based on factors such as leadership style, foreign policy agenda, and electoral incentives will shape peacekeeping contributions. However, we also argue that domestic political institutions enable or constrain leaders’ ability to employ this policy decision, where factors such as executive constraints and intragovernmental fractionalization further impact deployment considerations. We evaluate our expectations using statistical analysis of state-level personnel commitments to UN peacekeeping missions during the period of 1990-2015. This research highlights the importance of considering more nuanced and time-varying factors within states in explaining deployments, as well as understanding how states’ international commitments are susceptible to domestic political factors.

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