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A few studies have pointed to the efficacies of tribal authorities and their governance structures. However, critics point to the challenge that governance by unelected authorities poses against democratic norms. This study examines this compatibility debate by focusing on the legitimacy of traditional leaders in democratizing countries. Does citizens' trust in traditional authorities reinforce or undermine democratic institutions? We argue that traditional institutions in spaces where armed conflicts are prevalent pose a challenge to democratization. They survive and thrive on in-group cohesion and order-based on identity markers such as ethnicity and tribes. Outgroup fear is instrumental to the leaders in mobilizing the group members, which is anti-thesis to democratic institutions that seek to cut across ethnic cleavages. We test this conjecture by designing and implementing survey research in Somalia, where tribal dynamics are deeply rooted, while democratization efforts are just beginning. From August 2020 to October 2020, we surveyed 1507 Somali citizens in three cities, Mogadishu, Baidoa, and Kismayo. Our initial findings suggest that an individual's choice between traditional and democratic institutions is competing rather than compatible. As expected, fear of violence has a vital role in increasing individuals' trust in traditional authorities, making them more susceptible to armed mobilization [making them more ready to fight for the leaders]. These findings inform policymakers on the efficacy (or lack thereof) of seeking compatibility between democratic governance and traditional institutions in transitional regions where armed conflict is common.