Consolidation of Precise Media Coverage

• In Event: Coordination and Information

Abstract

We study a dynamic model concerning precision of media coverage. Conventional wisdom suggests that, anticipating negative media coverage of themselves, unpopular incumbents tend to reduce media precision, while popular incumbents welcome more precise media coverage of themselves. Empirical observations, however, show that popular incumbents in many countries decrease media precision. To address this puzzle, we explore the incumbent's incentive to control media precision, and also his decision on consolidating institutions that constrain future leaders’ capacity of influencing media precision. We find that popular incumbents want to maintain the favorable belief of the voter, which leads them to reduce media precision to diminish the credibility of news media that can potentially produce a news report altering the voter's belief. By contrast, unpopular incumbents have an incentive to enhance media precision since the high credibility of news media is a precondition for a favorable new report to change the voter's belief. Our dynamics framework further suggests conditions supporting a reinforcing mechanism that leads to high media precision and freedom in some countries. In other countries, institutions are not consolidated; media precision is subject to governmental interference and thus fluctuates.

Authors

• Greg Chih-Hsin Sheen, National Cheng Kung University

• Myunghoon Kang, Bilkent University