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Scholars have noted that authoritarian regimes tend to embrace nationalism for self-legitimization. This article, investigates China’s political indoctrination (“Thought work”) between 1983 and 1993 and concludes that this process involves tensions. As an authoritarian state in early post-communist transition, China played down the Marxist notion of class struggle and internationalism. However, unlike the Soviet bloc of the 1950s, China rarely invoked conventional elements of nationalism like ethnic purification, economic autarky, and military irridentism. Different from most contemporary socialist states, China had not yet developed a polished discourse of socialist patriotism as it would do in the middle 1990s. These distinctions make this decade (1983-1993) look like a complicated gap between communism and nationalism. There was an initiative to invoke patriotism, but it did not go far. The system asserted that ideological work should give way to “substantial affairs”, that is, economic development, which left limited space for ideological reconstruction. Meanwhile, in carrying out grassroot indoctrination, propagandists tended to adapt old Maoist language rather than invent new tradition. Nor did the overall low levels of education and social research, in combination with a negative reflection on Mao’s legacy, immediately glorify China’s national history. This article develops Linz and Stepan’s concept of post-totalitarian regime to show how remnant totalitarian elements as well as the effort to get rid of them jointly moderated a move to nationalism. China’s experience was also unique in comparison with other socialist states.