The Merits of Exclusion for the Stability of Autocratic Regimes

• In Event: Authoritarian Elites and Survival

Abstract

There is a consensus in the literature on comparative authoritarianism that co-optation rather than exclusion is the norm in party-based autocracies (Geddes 2003, 59). The underlying assumption is that party regimes possess institutional channels that render power sharing between elites stable and predictable. As a result, regime elites are thought to gain the greatest pay-off if all factions within the ruling party stay united. This argument is seemingly supported by findings which suggest that elite splits are the primary cause of autocratic breakdown (for example, Svolik 2012). Yet this notion conceals the fact that a significant number of elite splits do not jeopardise the stability autocratic rule. This paper addresses this puzzle by asking, How do autocratic regimes survive, or even take advantage of, elite splits?

Based on the preliminary findings of the applicant’s doctoral thesis, the paper traces dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in the dominant party regimes of Serbia (1990-2000) and Montenegro (1990-2020).
In both countries, the transition from state socialism was managed by the socialist successor parties, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) led by Slobodan Milošević and the Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro (DPS). In advance of the first multi-party elections in 1990, both parties had undergone personnel and programmatic reorganisation. Representatives of the republics’ aspiring oppositions had replaced high-ranking figures and promoted a Serb nationalist and isolationist programme. Throughout the 1990s, Serbia’s ruling party stayed united in its policy line, eager to shore up support for its warfare in Bosnia and Kosovo among minor opposition parties. But in doing so, the SPS was unable to accommodate the growing social consensus on European integration. In 2000, the SPS was finally defeated by a broad opposition coalition supported by the EU. In comparison, Montenegro’s dominant party proved to be more adaptable to environmental changes. In a further party split in 1997, Montenegro’s ruling party expelled its Serb nationalist faction, which in turn aspired to become the DPS’ strongest opponent. This turnaround earned the DPS the support of Montenegro’s anti-Milošević opposition and international recognition as a pro-Western reformer. In the following period, the party pushed for state independence from Serbia, allowing the DPS to reform Montenegro’s institutions and marginalise actors in favour of a state union with Serbia.

The case studies illustrate that elite splits are not always detrimental, but they may even be a source of regime stability. Combining insights from comparative authoritarianism and the new institutionalisms, the paper proposes that elite splits can stabilise autocratic regimes in three ways: First, elite splits can relief an autocratic ruling coalition of patronage spending and/or eroding conflicts. In doing so, selective expulsions can restore the discipline among the remaining members of the ruling coalition. Second, elite splits can enable the co-optation of new players. Excluding elites who stand in the way of incorporating outside actors can unlock new, formerly untapped, resources. Finally, elite splits can facilitate the regime's ideological reorientation. Autocratic regimes can instrumentalise elite splits to deflect the blame for unpopular policies on departing elites, thereby achieving the regime’s ideational ‘re-branding’. The paper concludes that the outcome of elite splits hinges on a regime’s ability to prepare and compensate, pointing to institutional devices for ‘identifying’, ‘approaching’, ‘co-opting’, and ‘un-co-opting’ elite actors.


Geddes, B. (2003). Paradigms and sand castles: Theory building and research design in comparative politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Svolik, M. (2012). The politics of authoritarian rule. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Author

• Claudia Lastro, University of Graz