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Manipulation of election timing is an oft-used tool for political leaders to tilt the electoral field toward themselves. On the one hand, a front-load election might increase citizens' support for the government because the incumbents can opportunistically choose the election timing and subsequent electoral victories are conducive to updating citizens' belief on government strengths. On the other hand, manipulation of election timing could lower citizens' evaluation of the government regardless of election results because the voters might think of an unscheduled election as a signal of government weaknesses. Although the cabinet in some parliamentary democracies frequently manipulates election timing, little research has been done thus far on how and to what extent election-timing manipulation enhances or damages popular support for the government. We empirically assess the impact of election-timing manipulation on popular support and trust for the government with experimental data collected by our original surveys conducted in Japan. We find that the manipulation effects change depending on the rationale for an unscheduled election and the legislature's remaining term.