Strategic Agenda Setting and Election Timing in the U.S. House

• In Event: Political Consequences of Election Timing

Abstract

The legislative cartel model argues that the majority party creates a favorable party brand through agenda-setting by constructing a set of votes to increase their members' chances of reelection. While much of the literature has focused on a single constituency, the structure of the U.S. electoral system explicitly builds in two constituencies based on the primary and general elections. In order to be successful, legislators have incentives to send different signals to these constituencies at different times in the election cycle. Here, I argue that the majority party leadership strategically sets the agenda to send different informational signals about the party's more moderate members prior to each election. Using roll-call votes from the 88th-113th Congresses, I find that there is a larger difference between the cutpoints of bills considered before and after the primary election in election years than in non-election years. These findings help resolve the puzzle of why it seems that legislators typically vote more with their party than would be expected, given the preferences of voters in the general election.

Author

• Stephanie A. Nail, Stanford University