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Because a dictator’s desire for passing power to children collides with the elites’ desire for power-sharing, inclusive authoritarian institutions are antithetical to dynastic succession. The theoretical arguments are tested here in contemporary China, for which we provide the first systematic evidence of the existence of prevalent dynastic succession. We further demonstrate that the surge of princelings was driven by national leaders but resisted by political elites through more inclusive institutions such as the communist party's national congress, in particular during dynastic transition. Our findings are robust as we utilize two separate yet mutually corroborative measures of clandestine princeling status: one from comprehensive qualitative research, the other from our innovative given-name-as-text-data method that exploits the unique style with which the communist revolutionary leaders named their babies around 1949. Our research suggests that dictators face a fundamental tradeoff between institutionalization and dynastic succession.