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Armed groups play an integral role in allowing or hindering humanitarian access to civilians in civil wars. However, armed groups have developed a bad reputation when it comes to collaborating with humanitarian organizations, with frequent reports of theft, banditry, and attacks on aid workers. Because of this, existing research has largely characterized armed groups as an enemy to aid delivery, instead of a potential ally. Despite this reputation, some armed groups have strategic motivations to collaborate with aid organizations. I argue that armed groups’ control over territory and governing capacity both render armed groups more likely to collaborate with aid organizations due to the unique strategic considerations that accompany these developments. I test my argument on a “least likely” case-the Taliban in Afghanistan and find evidence of the three mechanisms that I theorize. The findings carry implications for understanding the particular challenges and opportunities that armed groups present to aid organizations operating in conflict zones.