Resistance and Control: State Building Through Rebel-Civilian Relations

• In Event: The Implications of Rebel Governance

Abstract

After rebel victory, how does rebel governance affect post-war politics? Rebel governments seek to maintain stability, prevent a return to war, and consolidate their power over the entire state. I argue that this is achieved by strategically allocating resources towards public goods and the military, and that the subnational distribution of these resources depends on the wartime experiences of the new rebel government and their rivals. I build on existing literatures on statebuilding, distributive politics, and rebel governance to develop a theory of post-war governance. During civil war, rebels can exercise substantial social control over civilian life and increase their organizational capacity by forming ties with key civilians who aid in resource extraction and local governance. After civil war, this organizational capacity reduces governing costs and decreases budget constraints for the rebel government in areas where it maintains these rebel-civilian ties. However, security concerns increase where their rivals sustain organizational capacity through their own rebel-civilian ties. The interaction between the organizational capacity of the new state and its rivals explains patterns of cooperation, cooptation, and coercion.

Author

• Shelley Liu, UC Berkeley