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Rhetoric and Democracy in Plato’s Phaedrus and Statesman

Sat, October 2, 4:00 to 5:30pm PDT (4:00 to 5:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

In this paper I will explore the impact on politics of rhetoric as it is conceived in Plato’s Phaedrus and Statesman. Specifically, I will consider how public rhetoric effects the democratic citizen’s ability to participate meaningfully in the regime. In the Phaedrus, the public rhetoric of the law courts and the assembly is contrasted to the dialectical speech of the philosopher. The philosopher or “dialectician,” according to Socrates, when they perceive particular things in this world use their reason to categorize these particulars into their kinds or classes, or to grasp their essential nature, their idea or form. Doing so allows the thinker to give definitions of things—to say what they are—allowing for the truth the be revealed. Dialectic thus allows for a form of speech that seeks to enlighten by revealing the truth. Rhetoric seeks the opposite. The rhetor, according to Socrates, although knowing “what each thing truly is,” and thus its essence or idea, for the sake of winning or defeating their opponents seeks to deceive in the law-courts and assembly in two related ways. In its ability to speak on opposite sides of an issue, rhetoric makes great matters such as justice, goodness and beauty appear, when convenient, like injustice, evil, and ugliness, and hence their opposites. Rhetoric deceives, therefore, by making falsehood appear like truth. Related is that such speaking encourages a belief in “perspectivalism” among its listeners, or the belief that what something is is simply how you perceive it; what appears just for one person can equally appear and therefore be unjust for another. It fosters the belief, in other words, that there are no stable essences or forms that can provide shared meanings to citizens of the regime.

In contrast to Socrates in the Phaedrus, the Eleatic Stranger in the Statesman allows for a much more positive role for public rhetoric in the regime. The potentially benign effect of rhetoric comes to light through the Stranger’s distinction between the art of statesmanship and the rhetorical art. According to the Stranger, the true political art has rational knowledge of the first principles of the greatest things in the city: beauty, goodness and justice. The rhetorical art, on the other hand, has knowledge of how to persuade the many through mythology rather than reason. One such example of the use of mythology to persuade the many, I will argue, is the Stranger’s telling of the myth of the origin and rule of the cosmos by a divine maker near the beginning of the dialogue. It is a myth, therefore, of the first things in time that is a poetic image of the first things in principle to which the many do not have direct, unmediated rational access. The Stranger therefore suggests that the role of political myth is to persuade the many of the correctness of the laws, the laws themselves an imitation of the first principles of beauty, goodness and justice. The political art, in other words, needs political myth-making to ensure the rule of law. Rhetoric, therefore, can have a positive role, as it can allow for the persuasion and consent of the many in a law-based democracy rather than the rule of force.

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