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How does religion affect armed conflict? In this paper, I argue that the religious institution of monasticism can increase the likelihood of armed insurgency, when practitioners of monasticism are threatened with an external political power. I contend that monasticism is more likely to concentrate land and wealth in the hands of a few monastic elites and produce a large population of practitioners who support this institution on which their livelihoods depend. This creates strong incentives and population support for the monastic elites to resist state-building endeavors by external rulers. To corroborate this theory, I use process tracing in a comparative analysis of China’s two peripheral regions – Tibet and Xinjiang – in the early 1950s. I find that Tibet’s deep-seated Buddhist monasticism had formed a strong monastic elite class. The elites prevented Beijing from resettling Han Chinese to the plateau – a centuries-long strategy of inner China’s rulers to consolidate control over peripheral regions – which created the opportunity for the mobilization of armed insurgents in 1958. By contrast, the absence of monasticism in Xinjiang’s Islamism permitted more equal land and wealth distribution. This generated less resistance to Beijing’s resettlement of a large number of Han Chinese from inner China, which effectively contained any existing insurgency during the Maoist period. Evidence for my analysis comes from over 250 hitherto untapped historical gazetteers, my 12-month-long ethnographic research, and secondary historical analyses.
The paper elucidates a new mechanism through which religion affects contentious politics. In doing so, it also sheds new light on the contemporary politics of two of the world’s most restive regions. Whereas Tibet’s 1958 insurgency prompted Beijing to rely heavily on the national military to stabilize the region ever since, Xinjiang’s increasing securitization in the 1950s encouraged Beijing to rely almost exclusively on population resettlement. However, the strategy of resettlement became increasingly difficult to sustain after the 1978 market reform, as the state's ability to allocate production inputs to the Han settlers began to erode. The decline of population resettlement permitted the re-emergence of armed insurgency in Xinjiang in the 1980s, culminating in the mid-2010s. Despite ongoing political protests and self-immolation in Tibet in recent decades, none of the anti-state violence have reached the same level of destruction as militarized rebellion and terrorist insurgency in Xinjiang. As such, Beijing’s more dramatic policies of repression in Xinjiang than that in Tibet today can be attributed to the long-term unintended effects of a state-building strategy enabled by the absence of monastic religious practices.