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Politicizing the Phase-Out: Political Framings and Nuclear Energy in Japan

Tue, September 28, 6:00 to 7:30am PDT (6:00 to 7:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

Germany’s decision to phase out all of its seventeen nuclear reactors was sparked by the 2011 Fukushima nuclear meltdown. In the immediate aftermath of the most devastating nuclear disaster, the Japanese government led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) also suspended all nuclear reactors and pushed for a similar nuclear phase-out. The momentum, however, quickly changed when the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) returned to power in 2012. Under the leadership of Abe Shinzo, nine nuclear reactors have been restarted and six more have been approved to restart. This policy shift came despite the arduous recovery efforts in Fukushima and the persistently high level of antinuclear sentiments among the Japanese public. What explains the initial phase-out policy and its reversal in Japan? What is the future role of nuclear power in Japan’s energy policy and its ambitious plan to reach carbon neutrality by 2050?

Scholars have highlighted the close relationship between the government and the nuclear industry and energy security as key factors shaping Japan’s nuclear energy development. However, existing analyses fail to account for the DPJ’s decision to phase out nuclear power despite the vested interests of pro-nuclear politicians and the nuclear industry and the subsequent reversal of the phase-out by the Abe government. Building on the literature on path dependence and critical junctures, this paper seeks to explain continuity and change in energy policymaking and shed light on the interplay between exogenous shocks and domestic politics with regard to nuclear energy. By comparing domestic political debates on nuclear energy prior to and after the Fukushima disaster, I argue that the 2011 nuclear meltdown served as a critical juncture in energy policymaking and caused competing political framings of nuclear power. What is critical is not just the emergence of a major crisis but how policymakers attach meaning to the external shock and recast their energy policies.

Prior to the Fukushima disaster, nuclear energy in Japan was framed as an essential base-load energy source. In fact, the terms commonly used in other countries, such as “nuclear power station” or “nuclear energy,” are not used in Japanese. Instead, “atomic energy” or “atomic power station” are used to frame nuclear power as a nonthreatening and beneficial source of energy. In the new framing of the DPJ government, however, what happened in Fukushima was tantamount to Japan “being invaded by an invisible enemy.” As such, the DPJ government declared that nuclear power was a major risk that should not be sustained, declaring the policy of Datsu Genpatsu (or escaping from nuclear energy). However, the initial phase-out decision did not pan out as the short-lived Kan Naoto government failed to establish a new set of institutional choices for alternative energy sources. Soon, the previous framing of nuclear energy as reliable base-load energy resurfaced with a new focus. In contrast to the DPJ government’s framing, the Abe government has promoted nuclear power as a key component of economic recovery, environmental protection, and the infrastructure export drive.

In October 2020, the newly-installed Suga Yoshihide government announced its ambitious goal of reaching carbon neutrality by 2050. In its new environmental outlook, nuclear energy will gain further political boost. Japan’s relentless push for nuclear power, however, raises the specter of another nuclear accident and brings up questions about nuclear safety and nonproliferation. These concerns are more alarming in East Asia as the region has the increasing number of nuclear reactors, while regional cooperation on nuclear energy or nuclear safety is virtually absent.

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