Missteps and Mutinies: A New Coup-Proofing Paradox

• In Event: Regime Durability in the Face of Coups

Abstract

Coup-proofing has been shown to reduce coup risk, but such tactics can also reduce military effectiveness. While a robust literature has engaged in analyzing this paradox, scholars have yet to consider other consequences of coup-proofing. This paper examines a new coup-proofing paradox that considers the impact of coup-proofing strategies on an alternate form of military insubordination—mutinies. Mutinies are an important form of military disobedience in which troops outwardly express grievances, but do not attempt to unseat a sitting executive. Though often viewed as less dramatic than coups, mutinies can have significant political and economic consequences. We present a theoretical framework that suggests that while coup-proofing strategies may limit the ability to launch a coup, coup-proofing does little to assuage troops’ disposition or ability to mutiny. Utilizing novel data on global instances of military mutiny from 1945 to 2018, we show how coup-proofing tactics such as counterbalancing or elite purges actually increase the likelihood of mutiny. The findings demonstrate the consequences of coup-proofing and underscore the importance of understanding troops’ repertoire of military insubordination.

Authors

• Christopher Michael Faulkner, United States Naval War College

• Jaclyn m Johnson, University of Kentucky

• Jonathan M. Powell, University of Central Florida

• Rebecca Eileen Schiel