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This paper explores the political implications of two key trends under the regime of finance-led growth: the rise in mass financial wealth and the expansion in asset purchases by central banks. We argue that these trends have created strong incentives for elected officials to become more responsive to the stock market than the real economy, and to bolster asset prices through applying pressure on central banks. We examine the case of Japan, where the central bank has initiated one of the world’s largest asset purchase programs. We find that stock market declines are robustly associated with a surge in political pressure on the Bank of Japan, but there is less consistent evidence that political pressure is commensurate with the scale of equity-linked asset purchases. Qualitative evidence further shows that politicians are also concerned about the Bank’s excessive exposure to equities. These findings suggest that elites face complex tradeoffs between supporting wealth preservation and mitigating the risks of moral hazard.