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Keep Winning with WinRed? Online Fundraising Platform as the Party’s Public Good

Sat, October 2, 4:00 to 5:30pm PDT (4:00 to 5:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

Online campaign fundraising platforms—ActBlue for Democrats, WinRed for Republicans—increasingly dominate the fundraising landscape of U.S. elections. Both are conduits that strive to boost fundraising efforts and streamline giving for potential donors. ActBlue grew organically,gradually incorporating Democratic campaigns since 2004; WinRed was fast-track implemented in 2019, endorsed by the Republican National Committee, and strongly encouraged by the party and the sitting president.While not mirror images of each other, both party’s campaigns use the platform for similar rea-sons: they lower transaction costs in digital fundraising campaigns, solve a coordination problem,and help centralize and standardize data collection of the contact information and observed behavior of campaign donors, including small donors. In particular, the GOP advocated for the use of WinRed—twisting quite a few arms in the attempt—to unify and replace the various plat-forms formerly used by Republican candidates and committees. WinRed was indeed GOP’s first successful party-coordinated platform, after multiple failures to replicate the success of ActBlue.Such a party-coordinated data warehouse can serve as a form of public goods within parties,helping parties design more effective campaign strategies such as micro-targeted solicitation and advertising (Albert 2020). However, public goods often suffer from under-provision (Ostrom,1990), and online fundraising platforms may be no exception. Since individual campaigns need not fully internalize the positive externalities of enhanced data infrastructure of their parties,the rate at which campaigns migrate to party-endorsed digital platforms may be sub-optimal for parties seeking to improve overall fundraising outcomes and electoral performance of their candidates.

To understand the extent to which candidates under-utilize party-endorsed fundraising plat-forms in the absence of coordination or coercion by party leadership, we first need to understand whether candidates find it individually rational to join these digital fundraising platforms. Does Joining a party-endorsed platform lead to a fundraising boost? Moreover, are there heterogeneity effects by salient candidate characteristics, including electoral traits (e.g., party, prior fundraising levels, incumbency), descriptive representation (e.g., gender, race, socioeconomic status), and legislative power (e.g., legislative committee and party rank)?

To answer these questions, we construct a panel data set of all Republican federal candidates in the 2020 election cycle, taking advantage of the rapid, party-pushed transition to WinRed in mid-2019. For all candidates that joined a party-endorsed digital fundraising platform at some point during this period, we record the dates of these events through web scraping of archived campaign websites. Moreover, we collect all campaign contributions received by each campaign,including both itemized and unitemized contributions from the Federal Election Commission(FEC). Finally, we compile candidates’ biographic information and electoral characteristics from the FEC, and legislative attributes from Congress’s official websites and the two major parties.We start with a difference-in-differences (DiD) design to estimate whether candidates on average raise more money after joining WinRed. The treatment variable is whether a campaign joined the platform in a given year-quarter. The outcome variable is a campaign’s total fundraising in each year-quarter, and we analyze whether fundraising increases in the quarter(s) after treatment. We include candidate fixed effects as well as a separate year-quarter fixed effect by party.We recognize that candidates strategically decide whether and when to join a party-endorsed fundraising platform, which may violate the parallel-trends assumption. Hence we will apply recent methodological advances (Xu, 2017; Imai et al., 2020) to construct valid counterfactuals for treated units.

We will also explore theoretically important heterogeneity in treatment effects. For example,suppose the marginal benefits of joining ActBlue or WinRed are higher for those who already raise more money than other co-partisan candidates. In that case, these platforms may further consolidate legislative power within the hands of star fundraisers, who disproportionately control the party and legislative agenda through formal appointments to leadership positions and informal influence-buying within legislatures (Kistner, 2020). Also, if candidates who are male,white, and wealthy benefit more from joining party-endorsed platforms, this may threaten to undo recent progress in descriptive representation in elections (Lawless and Fox, 2005; Fox and Lawless, 2005; Carnes, 2013; Grose, 2011) and undermine the increasing diversity in donor pools(Alvarez et al., 2020; Grumbach et al., 2020; Grumbach and Sahn, 2020).

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