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United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions may have unintended consequences. Studies on unintended consequences of peacekeeping missions generally focus on the Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA), in which the sole perpetrators are the peacekeepers themselves. However, troop-contributing governments are never held accountable for the actions of their peacekeepers. Misconducts that peacekeepers engage in may go beyond the abusive behavior and simple theft as sometimes they may also engage in illegal mineral trade and favoring one warring party over another, which are not always driven by peacekeepers' individual interests but by home governments' orders. Therefore, in this paper, looking at the composition of the peacekeepers, I speculate about the primary interests of the troop-contributing governments and their effect on the success of missions. Using a mediation analysis, I find that missions dominated by the troop-contributing countries (TCCs) with public interests decrease the civilian violence through decreasing peacekeepers' misconducts. The results show that the composition of peacekeepers have both direct and indirect effects on the civilian violence. The direct effect comes from the primary motivations of the governments, whether they participate to bring peace. The indirect effect arises, however, to the extent that troop-contributing governments are willing to prosecute their personnel when they engage in misconducts.