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Using a matching analysis and data from an original survey and survey experiments conducted in January 2021, this paper evaluates the effects of an inclusive consultation regulation in Indonesia on the degree to which village budgets represent the interests of ordinary villagers and female villagers in particular. In addition, it tests the effects of this inclusive regulation on the distribution of COVID-19 cash transfers by village governments.
In recent years, many developing countries have implemented fiscal decentralization reforms with community participation requirements aimed at improving the representation of ordinary and marginalized citizens’ interests. Such reforms have had mixed results, particularly regarding the representation of women’s interests. In response to concerns about low female participation in village governance, several districts in Indonesia issued regulations in 2019, which require a more inclusive format for village planning and budgeting community consultations. The new regulations establish separate inclusive consultations including women and people with disabilities and requires all proposed activities from the inclusive consultations to be added to the list of proposed activities from the regular, male-dominated consultation. This process ensures that the aspirations of women and other marginalized groups are communicated to policymakers and may increase the likelihood that they are addressed.
I exploit a district-level assignment mechanism, which is orthogonal to village-level covariates, to test the effects of this inclusive regulation on the degree to which village budgets represent the preferences of ordinary villagers and female villages in particular. In January 2021, I conduct an original survey with 1,200 respondents in 30 villages in Indonesia and collect village-level budgeting data to measure the degree to which village budgets and community consultations reflect the interests of ordinary and female villagers. In order to measure villagers’ budgetary preferences, I implement an allocation game embedded in the in-person survey. I compare villagers’ preferences as revealed in the allocation game to actual village budget allocations. I use matching to estimate the effects of the inclusive budget consultations on budgetary preference alignment.
I also conduct vignette experiments to distinguish between several different mechanisms that may drive the effects of the inclusive consultation requirement on female budgetary preference alignment. These experiments are conducted with 225 female villagers and 974 village heads in districts without the inclusive consultation regulation located in four provinces. Specifically, I evaluate hypotheses that the inclusive consultations facilitate the inclusion of female voices through 1) female participation and/or 2) government responsiveness from a) salience of female preferences and/or b) social and political pressure.
The inclusive consultations may lower the stakes for women to attend and speak up at budget consultations. In addition, requirements for the village budget drafting team to consider the ideas submitted at the inclusive consultation and attach these ideas to the budget they submit to the district government may encourage the village government to include more female preferences in the village budget. These requirements may make the village governments more responsive to women’s concerns by increasing the visibility of female preference. Alternatively, this process could also make it easier for villagers, civil society organizations, and government officials to evaluate whether women’s preferences are represented in the village budget, thereby increasing social and political pressure.
Finally, this paper evaluates the effects of the aforementioned inclusive consultation regulation on the distribution of COVID-19 cash transfers by village governments. There are three distinct ways in which village governments have distributed COVID cash transfer: 1) as prescribed by national regulations (approximately $40 per month for six months given to approximately 30% of households identified by neighborhood association chairs as being in need based on economic or health criteria); 2) distributed equally to all households (with each household only receiving about $12 per month); or 3) targeted clientelistically to villagers who voted for the village head and friends and relatives of the village head. Village governments are required to hold community consultation to approve the list of cash transfer recipients. Villages that were also required to hold inclusive community consultations for regular village budgeting may be less likely to distribute funds clientelistically because the inclusive consultations may have generated more accountability by the village government towards marginalized villagers, including those in greatest need of COVID cash transfers.