Compliance and Institutional Flexibility in Climate Change Cooperation

• In Event: Compliance and Defiance with International Commitments

Abstract

When the Paris Agreement was signed in 2016, it was heralded as a significant step toward combating climate change. Yet the treaty's reliance on nationally determined contributions and a yet-to-be-specified monitoring scheme ignores much of what has made previous international treaties successful. Under what conditions does the Paris Agreement still impact the climate policies of signatory states? This paper analyzes compliance with the Paris Agreement among 40 developed and emerging economies over the last four years. It analyzes how domestic mobilization and monitoring have stepped in to overcome some of the international agreement's shortfalls and theorizes about the conditions under which such action falls short in generating effective climate policy. By illustrating the strengths and limitations of monitoring in a complex arena like climate change, the paper contributes to the literature on international cooperation and compliance and to the broader policy arena.

Authors

• Julia C. Morse, University of California, Santa Barbara

• Lea M. Toubian, University of Santa Barbara, California