Assessing the Effects of Credible Commitments

• In Event: Novel Survey Experiments in Nuclear Politics

Abstract

Nuclear states offer nuclear security guarantees in part to reassure allies that nuclear proliferation is not necessary. Existing literature posits the main challenge lies in making guarantees sufficiently credible. If allies don’t believe their guarantor will actually come to their aid, they may seek alternate means of protection, including through nuclear proliferation. In contrast, new work has argued overly credible demonstrations of resolve can also backfire; such demonstrations can create fears that guarantors will entrap clients into precipitous nuclear conflicts. In turn, clients may distance themselves from the alliance or seek independent sources of security, including through the pursuit of nuclear weapons. In this paper, I use survey experiments to test how citizens in NATO countries respond to U.S. demonstrations of resolve. This paper brings to bear new evidence on the conditions under which security guarantees succeed or fail to reassure allies.

Author

• Lauren Sukin, Stanford University