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Electoral Cycles in Closed Autocracies: Evidence from Petitions in the GDR

Fri, October 1, 12:00 to 1:30pm PDT (12:00 to 1:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

Competitive multiparty elections are usually seen as precondition for constituent responsiveness. This paper challenges this conventional understanding of elections and shows that elections can create incentives for incumbents to respond to and address citizen demands even in the absence of competition. I argue that electoral cycles of responsiveness and accountability exist even in closed autocracies because non-competitive elections in these regimes require high voluntary turnout to serve their functions. As a consequence, incumbents distribute additional goods or improve responsiveness before elections to maximize turnout. Using an original dataset of petitions to the government of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), I show that response times to petitions were up to 27 percent shorter before elections. This difference is stronger for petitions critical of the regime: in an effort to keep regime approval high, electoral cycles in closed regimes target those individuals who have signaled dissatisfaction with the performance of the government. Improved responsiveness is also substantively meaningful: the probability that petitions were successful increased by up to 69 percent before elections. The paper furthers our understanding of electoral strategies in closed regimes and contributes to an emerging research agenda on government responsiveness and accountability in autocracies.

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