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What mechanisms allow refugee protection norms to operate in countries that are uncommitted to the international refugee regime? I formulate an answer to this question by comparing the responses of four South and Southeast Asian countries to the 2017 Rohingya refugee crisis. The existing research assumes that the protection of refugees, either through asylum or aid, is an international public good and that, if countries are not integrated or inadequately integrated into a formal regime for cooperation, it would result in a collective action failure in the provision of refugee protection. In other words, we would expect states that are non-signatories to the UN Refugee Convention or states that have not integrated the Convention’s norms into domestic laws to withhold adequate protection from refugees. And yet, states frequently engage in international cooperation over the provision of refugee protection even when they are not bound by the international refugee regime to do so. By building on theories of international regime complexity, I argue that international cooperation on refugee protection may be nested in or run parallel to other international regimes of cooperation. I hypothesize that non-signatory states’ decision to grant protection to refugees is structured by whether doing so will advance their interest in a parallel regime they are invested in, and whether domestic institutions can form enduring linkages with such parallel regimes. I argue that states that displace refugee issues to the regime on humanitarian and disaster relief are more likely to provide protection to refugees. Conversely, states that displace refugee issues to the anti-trafficking regime are likely to withhold protection.