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Civil conflicts are notoriously intractable. Even after adversaries agree to formalize peace and power-sharing, civil wars recur around 50 percent of the time. While the conventional wisdom emphasizes who should govern or who should control territory as the main incompatibilities of civil war, I argue that an underexplored critical component is the incompatibility of the adversaries’ governance systems. This incompatibility occurs when the legal institutions that serve the fundamental functions of government, a formalization of the values, beliefs, and expectations of how society should be/is structured, diverge. Because peace agreements are a formalized legal framework for post-conflict governance, including future dispute resolution among warring parties, the compatibility of their governance systems for creating/maintaining social order should have direct implications for the durability of peace. If adversaries have incompatible systems of governance then power-sharing without any reconciliation of this incompatibility is likely to be ill-fated. This implies that the conventional wisdom emphasizing a division of wealth, territory, or power among adversaries may be counterproductive and even detrimental to peace. To examine this argument, I present an original dataset of rebel and incumbent governance systems and power-sharing promises and practices from 1989-2006.