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Why did the European Coal and Steel Community succeed while the European Defense Community failed? Prior cooperation, an imbalance of power between prospective partners is considered bad for successful cooperation. The weaker state often fears that the stronger state would coerce and dominate in an anarchic world. Thus, a stronger state interested in cooperation may be motivated to transfer its resources to the weaker state. Once states are relatively balanced, they can effectively pool their resources to achieve a common goal. However, some resources simply cannot be transferred or when transferred, its effective unit of power decreases. My central argument is that the transferability of resources influences whether states can effectively address the commitment problem which significantly determines cooperation between states. The transferability of resources refers to whether the resource at stake can be effectively distributed without its unit of power being affected. When a high level of transferability exists, commitment problem decreases as resources can be effectively shared to correct the imbalance of power. Thus, the likelihood of cooperation increases between states. On the other hand, when a low level of transferability exists, commitment problem increases between states as resources cannot be shared effectively to correct the imbalance of power. Thus, states are less likely to cooperate. To test my argument, I will process-trace the beginning to the end of the discussion of the EDC from 1950 to 1954 and the ECSC from 1945 to 1950. Key findings will show how resources itself played a critical role in the success and failure of the ECSC and EDC.