Whale of a Deal: A Bargaining Model of Treaty Exit

• In Event: Information Technology and Politics; Formal Theory; and American Political Thought Virtual Poster Session
  In Virtual Poster Session: Formal Theory Virtual Poster Session

Abstract

Britain's decision to withdraw from the E.U., or “Brexit;” members of the African Union calling for mass withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC); and the United States' withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and Open Skies Treaty, among others, are all examples of an increasing number of international institutions seemingly under threat by members exercising their power to withdraw formally. Why do states choose to withdraw rather than bargain for accommodation or simply breach to meet their needs? This paper presents a bargaining model of treaty exit that incorporates treaty features of obligation and flexibility to understand how the distributional shift in treaty costs and the effect of treaty precision and enforcement shape a member state's preference to withdraw overreaching a bargain, maintaining the status quo, or breaching. Since withdrawing is costly to international cooperation—foreclosing a forum within which to address interstate problems—it is puzzling why a state would choose to withdraw over other options. The theory's plausibility is assessed using three cases of withdrawal from the International Whaling Convention, UNIDO, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It concludes with some expectations for further testing and implications of the project for future research.

Author

• Taylor Dalton, University of Southern California