Governing by Ambiguity: Evidence from the Chinese Judicial System

• In Event: Promoting Human Rights: The Role of Law and Courts

Abstract

Notwithstanding its massive campaign to establish the “rule of law” in China, the Chinese Communist Party has often been accused of using its judicial system to punish dissidents. An often-quoted example is the crime Picking Quarrels (xunxin zishi), which is broadly defined as undermining public order by creating a disturbance in the public place. China observers have long denounced it as a catch-all offense abused by the state to arbitrarily punish dissidents. Applying machine learning to over 160,000 judicial documents released by the Supreme People’s Court, we find that, instead of being arbitrary and unpredictable, the enforcement of Picking Quarrels follows a clear governance logic. In the majority of cases, courts have used Picking Quarrels to regulate public display of violence in a routine and institutionalized way, which constitutes its infrastructural power. Meanwhile, the state has capitalized on the embedded ambiguity in the definition of Picking Quarrels to consolidate its despotic power. By redefining public order, the state imposes harsh punishment on actions targeting public authorities; by stretching the definition of public space, the state extends its control from offline activities to online speech. Using the legal institution of Picking Quarrels as an example, our analysis sheds light on the governance logic behind one of the most successful authoritarian regimes in the world.

Authors

• Qingyan WANG, University of Georgia

• Yifeng Wan, Johns Hopkins University

• Nanxi Zeng, Johns Hopkins University