Judicial Independence and Cooperation with the CJEU (Pre-Recorded)

• In Event: Challenges to the Rule of Law in Europe

Abstract

Though the EU is a rule of law community it struggles to make all member states engage fully in upholding its laws and values. Some issues have to do with concrete violations against basic rights others are more institutional having to do with the independence of the judicial system as such. In this article, we look at the institutional side demonstrating that there is a link between the degree to which the judicial branch of a Member State enjoys full independence and its national high court engagement with the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) though the preliminary reference procedure. While drawing on judicial dialogue instruments, it is demonstrated how higher courts that are less constrained by political power make more preliminary references. This finding supports the hypothesis that governments that keep their courts in a short leach may discourage national judges from engaging with Luxembourg. The article thus demonstrates that in the longer run even moderate political capture may impact on a uniform development of European law.

Authors

• Marlene Wind, University of Copenhagen

• Juan Antonio Mayoral, University of Copenhagen