The Threat of Subversion in Foreign-Imposed Democracies

• In Event: Identity Frames, Standing, and Conflict

Abstract

Why are some foreign-imposed democracies more durable than others? Many scholars assume that democratic regimes imposed through foreign military intervention typically fail because they are overturned by armed challengers. According to this perspective, foreign-imposed democracies rarely endure because foreign intervention triggers a violent domestic reaction, whether in the form of a nationalist backlash, an insurgency campaign, or a military coup. Yet, the majority of foreign-imposed democracies break down through an alternative pathway: they are subverted by leaders in the target state who rise to power through elections. This paper develops a theory explaining why some foreign-imposed democracies are more prone to anti-democratic subversion than others. I argue that the risk of subversion in foreign-imposed democracies is shaped by the nature of the commitment of the intervening state, and the incentives this creates for domestic actors to either abide by or undermine new democratic institutions. The paper illustrates the logic of the theory with a paired case study of the U.S. occupation of Japan from 1945-1952 (a case of success), and the U.S. occupation in South Korea from 1945-1948 (a case of failure).

Author

• Jonathan Monten, University College London