Repeated Interactions: Compliance at the IACHR

• In Event: International Law and Second-Order Compliance

Abstract

Why do states comply with non-binding recommendations from international institutions? I examine this question in the context of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which serves as the gate-keeper institution to the Inter-American Court. The Inter-American Commission monitors compliance with merits reports and friendly settlements negotiated with petitioners. Although the recommendations in these cases themselves are not legally binding, many states make compliance decisions under the shadow of a tribunal, in which non-compliance may result in the case being submitted to the Inter-American Court. Utilizing a new dataset produced in collaboration with the Notre Dame Reparations Design and Compliance Lab, I analyze variation in compliance outcomes. I hypothesize that states under the Inter-American Court’s jurisdiction are more likely to comply as the probability of referral to the court increases because they want to avoid the specter of the much costlier, legally-binding ruling. Moreover, because the Inter-American Commission and states are engaged in a series of repeated interactions, states under the Court’s jurisdiction will continue complying even after the probability of referral in the present case is reduced to zero. This is because they must preserve their reputations as “compliers” for future cases, in which the referral decision will be made anew.

Author

• Francesca Parente, Christopher Newport University