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Decentralized, community-based approaches to natural resource governance are believed to improve natural resource conditions while reducing poverty across the Global South. Despite apparent successes, one of the key challenges facing these approaches is that of inequality. The local distribution of cash and subsistence benefits to rural people under decentralized natural resource governance is often not only highly unequal, but also inequitable because it reflects pre-existing social inequalities by gender, class, and ethnicity. There is, however, a lack of rigorous evidence showing whether decentralized governance approaches make inequality in the natural resource sectors better or worse compared to before such arrangements are implemented. In other words, while the local distribution of environmental benefits under decentralization appears to be unequal, it is not yet clear whether it is more or less unequal than the distribution under other governance regimes, such as state ownership.
Both hypotheses have theoretical support. On one hand, institutions that are self-organized locally—without support from external actors such as governments—will tend to reflect the preferences of traditionally advantaged members of the community. The formal, externally imposed rules implemented under a decentralized, community-based resource governance program may therefore reduce inequality by providing some constraints on the powers of traditional elites. On the other hand, the formal institutions and bureaucratic structures inherent to decentralized natural resource governance may merely empower local elites further. This is because members of traditionally advantaged social groups tend to be more literate, politically connected, and advantaged when it comes to dealing with bureaucrats, and are therefore better able to navigate the institutions and processes of these programs, and to influence local rules.
We use the case of community forestry in Nepal to estimate and explain the impacts of natural resource decentralization reforms on inequality. In the early 1990s, Nepal began implementation of its community forestry reform, which established tens of thousands of local community forest user groups (CFUGs) in villages across the country and devolved authority and responsibility over the governance of millions of hectares of previously state-governed forests to these non-governmental community-based institutions. Similar to the community-based institutions created under natural resource decentralization reforms in other countries, CFUGs are village-level councils governed by local forest users, and they enjoy a large degree of autonomy to make their own rules, undertake natural resource management activities, and choose how the cash and subsistence benefits from natural resources are distributed among community members.
We use nationwide census data and impact evaluation methods to test two competing hypotheses in this study—that community-based resource management worsens inequality, and that it alleviates inequality. We also use qualitative interviews with government officials to identify the political processes that explain the impact of the reform on inequality.
Using data from the National Population Census in 2001 and 2011 (N = 737,474 households) in combination with government records on all CFUGs created across the country under the reform through 2011 (N = 17,662 CFUGs), our modeling results suggest that the reform reduced the gap in poverty rates between traditionally marginalized ethnic groups and the ethnic majority by approximately 6%. This supports the theory that the reform reduced inequality in the distribution of natural resource-related benefits to rural households, compared to pre-reform levels. The apparent effect of the reform on the poverty gap is strongest for the traditionally marginalized ethnic groups for whom the legal language of the reform explicitly sets aside specific cash and subsistence benefits that are not set aside for other ethnic groups, which suggests that it is largely these features of the reform that explain the effect on inequality.
Next, we use data from qualitative interviews with government officials involved in the formulation and implementation of the reform to understand the political processes that explain why these inequality-reducing design features were included in the reform. The qualitative evidence points to the importance of both domestic and international influences. Specifically, the qualitative evidence suggests that government agencies adopted these design features in response to political pressure from domestic social movements as well as the influence of foreign donors that were active in the natural resource sectors.
Taken together, the results provide evidence regarding the possible role that environmental decentralization reforms can play in reducing inequality, and the specific conditions under which we should expect those effects to be strong.