Machine [Gun] Politics: Why Politician Cooperate with Criminal Groups

• In Event: Criminal Politics in Brazil

Abstract

Why do politicians cooperate peacefully with organized criminal groups? Though interactions between organized criminal groups and politicians are typically characterized as coercive where politicians are threatened by criminal groups or embedded where the politician is a part of the criminal group, this project argues that there is a set of cooperative electoral strategies where politicians willingly engage with organized criminal groups at arms-length. They may even seek out these arrangements. I then argue that, in certain contexts, this is an equilibrium outcome that can be election winning and welfare maximizing for all involved except the voter. This project uses mixed methods research on the case of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, where there are multiple criminal organizations operating and substantial variation in their links to politicians. I first elucidate potential candidate incentives to cooperate with criminal groups, based on candidate interviews, an original database of candidate criminal history, and a survey with former municipal and state legislative candidates. Then, using a natural experiment and granular data on voting and a database I created on the presence of organized crime, I show how different types of political-criminal partnerships yield different local electoral outcomes. This theory and evidence expand our perception of different ways that politicians both engage with violent criminals and expect to gain from those interactions. and suggests how the literature on machine politics and criminally armed groups can be in dialogue with each other.

Author

• Jessie Bullock, Harvard University