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Must Deliberation Be Civil?

Tue, September 28, 6:00 to 7:30am PDT (6:00 to 7:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

Americans have participated in a protracted public debate on the topic of “civility” in recent years. On the one hand are those who insist that, however fierce our political disagreements, fellow citizens ought to engage one another in a polite and respectful fashion. On this view, certain tactics on display in opposition to the Trump administration—e.g., calling the president and his aides “fascists”, lashing out at them in rage—have violated an important normative constraint, summed up by the injunction to “be civil”. Against the so-called “civility police” are those who insist that moral outrage, not genteel courtesy, is the right response to egregious injustice. Faced with the incarceration of border children in squalid cages, separated from their parents—to name but one obvious evil—critics protest that calls for civility are actually a demand to silence those sounding the alarm as the values of liberal democracy are subverted from within.

Who is right? This paper offers a philosophical intervention into this public debate, contending that the morally defensible position is one synthesizing insights from both sides. My thesis is that there is indeed a moral requirement to exhibit a certain form of “civility” when deliberating with others, but that the nature and justification of this requirement are largely misunderstood. The orthodox assumption—held by both civility’s defenders and critics—is that if there is a duty to be civil to our political adversaries, it is a duty owed to them; on this view, our adversaries possess the correlative moral right, and so are wronged when they fail to receive the civil treatment they are allegedly due. I argue that this position is not plausible with respect to those who have perpetrated egregious injustice; their culpable wrongdoing has rendered them morally liable to certain treatment that would otherwise wrong them, and it is this insight that the critics of civility capture. Yet simply because a wrongdoer is liable to some treatment does not render that treatment justified all-things-considered. It depends on the collateral consequences of such conduct on others.

Accordingly, my claim is that we have a duty to practice civility in our deliberations (in a particular sense to be specified) because it has a certain kind of instrumental value: specifically, it guards against the onset of a toxic attitude that can destabilize liberal democracy itself. The attitude I have in mind is one I refer to as “political contempt”, understood here as an attitude of wholehearted hatred towards one’s political adversaries, the kind of hatred one exhibits toward enemies with whom one is at war. The expression of political contempt can destabilize liberal democracy in three ways. First, it invites a reciprocal reaction from one’s adversaries, inspiring or exacerbating their own contempt. If one’s adversaries are already hostile to the values of liberal democracy, this reaction risks emboldening their commitment to injustice—and so further endangers the victims of that injustice. Second, attitudes of political contempt can lead those who possess them to embrace disproportionate modes of resistance against injustice (e.g., the use of violence). Finally, even if one’s adversaries may merit political contempt in light of the heinousness of the injustices they sponsor, political contempt is incompatible with restoring healthy moral relations of civic friendship once those injustices are defeated. Just as nations must fight wars in ways that are compatible with resuming morally decent relations in their aftermath, political disagreements—however fierce—must be conducted similarly.

Part I of the paper introduces the debate. Part II reviews various definitions of civility, endorsing a negative definition. On this view, civility is at least in part a matter of refraining from communicating the aforementioned attitude of political contempt (even if it is what one genuinely feels). Here I explain what political contempt is and why it is so dangerous for the stability of liberal democratic institutions. I also show why civility, so understood, is (contrary to common assumptions) perfectly compatible with the expression of moral outrage, so long as it is communicated in a certain way. In Part III, I argue that even if those who perpetrate injustice are liable to suffer such expressions of political contempt (in their various manifestations)—and so would not be wronged by them—we owe it to those who would be harmed by the destabilization of liberal democracy to refrain (namely, future generations). In Part IV, I consider the objection that it is unreasonable to expect victims of serious injustice to refrain from expressing political contempt. I respond by conceding that civility expressed by victims of serious injustice is supererogatory—specifically, it is morally heroic—a gift to the future of liberal democracy that cannot legitimately be demanded of them.

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