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Partisan Distribution of Ministerial Portfolios in Asian-Pacific Democracies

Sat, October 2, 2:00 to 2:30pm PDT (2:00 to 2:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

How are ministerial portfolios allocated among coalition parties in Asian-Pacific democracies? Existing studies have examined the formation of coalition governments in Europe, Latin America, and Africa, but scholars have paid less attention to executive-legislative relations in democracies in the Asia-Pacific region. Indeed, the formation of coalition governments is not rare in this region, but there are almost no comprehensive cross-national studies on coalition governments in Asian-Pacific democracies. I believe that the lack of available data on Asian-Pacific governments led to this dearth of cross-national studies, so I built a dataset with over 250 coalition cabinets in 26 Asian-Pacific democracies from 1945 to 2019. Using this dataset, I investigated whether existing theories of partisan portfolio allocation can be successfully applied in this region. The Asia-Pacific region is characterized by high levels of heterogeneity of democratic institutions, economic development, and party systems. While focusing on this broad region, I was able to examine existing theoretical arguments about the partisan portfolio allocation in a more varied context, which allowed me to investigate the role of crucial factors which are usually held constant in existing studies that focus on other regions.

In this project, I find that the share of ministerial portfolios held by a party increases in rough proportion to the size of that party in the Asia-Pacific democracies, which supports the argument of the well-known "Gamson's Law". However, I also find that formateurs, the party which leads the government formation process, tend not to be undercompensated in Asian-Pacific democracies, contrary to a pattern usually found in their European counterparts. Rather, on average, a formateur bonus was enjoyed by formateurs in the Asia-Pacific region. I also find that a formateur bonus tends to vary depending on a county’s political and institutional contexts, such as the type of democratic regime, the power of the legislature, and the power of veto players. This suggests that scholars should re-examine some of our ideas about executive-legislative relations and portfolio allocation, which were largely based on Western Europe, by considering a wider set of institutional and political contexts. For those who study Asian-Pacific democratic politics, my results suggest that focusing more on the government formation process in this region will be a fruitful area of inquiry. For scholars studying other regions, new insights will be provided by the important heterogeneity across the countries in the Asian-Pacific region.

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