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While efforts toward political moderation and consensus have furthered democratic politics in part by conditioning and promoting tempered passions, compromise, nonviolence, and civility (all of which are ideal and practical characteristics of a pluralist democratic polity) instances of extremism on behalf of democratic claims have also contributed to the formation, if only momentarily, of democratic peoples and the pursuit of political equality within the American democratic tradition. That is, forms of extremism, which are themselves forms of exclusion, have been used to constitute unstable and transitory enactments of a democratic people, and to express its power and voice. This insight calls for the recognition that moments and acts of extremism are constitutive parts of the American democratic tradition and raises a heuristic question: how should we approach the appearance of extremism in our democratic tradition and what might these moments, acts, and actors tell us about the nature of American democracy? How are we to view a fraught democratic tradition formed both by moderates and extremists with all the passionate zealotry, violence, and incivility it entails?
To address these questions, I suggest that we must learn to adopt what Steven Johnston has called a “tragic sensibility,” and that we would be wise to jettison the hope of a singularly progressive view of American democracy’s development, or what Aziz Rana described as a faith in American “constitutional perfection.” In tragedy there is an unflinching recognition of both the extreme and the moderate, the success and the failure, and so, a tragic perspective might offer a helpful valence through which to view the development of American popular democracy. Such a heuristic framework might allow us to reconcile or hold in tension the normative and strategic necessity of political moderation along with the productive recourse to political extremes; the tragic failures of domination, dispossession, and exclusion, with the tragic hopes of deepening and expanding political equality and democratic self-rule. Engaging with the work of Joel Olson, Steven Johnston, and the “tragic tradition” of political thought, as well as the works of Aeschylus and Sophocles, I argue that tragedy provides a useful framework through which to reconcile a conception of uncompromising political extremism on behalf of democratic claims with the normative injunction of political moderation as constitutive parts of an American tradition of democratic political thought.
My turn to tragedy as a valence through which to screen popular democratic politics in the United States follows a tendency among democratic theorists to turn to tragedy as a means of describing and understanding the paradoxes and persistence of politics. Though I suggest that democratic extremism has contributed to American democratic development, I acknowledge the harms it has and can entail, and do not seek to legitimate or justify acts of extremism. Instead, I contend that instances and acts of democratic extremism are “tragic” because they are reasoned collective political responses to conditions in which democratic claims may not be made democratically due to the obstruction or opposition of conflicting forces. My suggestion of approaching the American democratic tradition and democratic politics as tragedy is an effort to accommodate democratic extremism, not to resolve, justify or legitimate. Through tragedy, Americans may recognize that their shared political history is a tale populated by intolerant republican zealots and violent democratic extremists in addition to the heroic and august statesmen, moderate leaders that dial-down the hue and cry of “the people out of doors,” and the architects of what Tocqueville famously described as a “new political science” for a “totally new world.”