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Curses or Blessings: How Low Asset Mobility Helps Firms Gain Government Support

Sun, October 3, 10:00 to 11:30am PDT (10:00 to 11:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

Low asset mobility is often seen as undermining the bargaining power of investors. This article advances an alternative view that emphasizes the positive effects of low asset mobility. I argue that governments prefer foreign firms with immobile assets because their commitment to stay is always more credible. I present a formal model to illustrate three crucial theoretical mechanisms: 1) the inverse credible commitment problem, 2) political concerns associated with firm performance, and 3) the intensity of competition for investments. I substantiate the theoretical predictions using data from China. Leveraging a policy change in enterprise income taxes in 2008, I use a difference in differences design to show that foreign firms with lower asset mobility are less likely to become targets of local governments’ predatory behaviors.

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