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Do economic sanctions against state sponsors of insurgents work? Although sanctions often aim to force countries like Iran to end their support for non-state armed groups, policymakers continue to debate the effectiveness of this tactic and very few academic works have systematically studied this topic. In this paper we address this gap using the bargaining framework and newly available datasets on economic sanctions, state sponsorship, and insurgent attacks. Our main finding is that sanctions are associated with decreased insurgent attacks, but only in the long term. In the short term, sanctions against state sponsors are followed by increased attacks against the sanctioner state and its allies. Moreover, the effectiveness of sanctions depends on whether insurgents have additional sources of funding. These results improve our understanding of sanction effectiveness and are relevant for both researchers and policymakers.