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Under what conditions can principals maintain interest alignment with their proxies over time? Specifically, how can the United States motivate its proxies over the course of a principal-agent relationship? Recent literature highlights the ability of principals to incentive agents based on the agent’s efforts while recognizing the limited conditions under which such incentives are effective. As such, I argue that successful motivation is best explained by the principal’s domestic considerations. Namely, principals who are able to withstand domestic pressures and maintain their preferences for the proxy throughout the relationship are more likely to achieve success. Drawing on archival and secondary evidence, this paper examines the United States’ relationship with the government of El Salvador during the twelve-year Salvadoran civil war. I employ process tracing along three pattern of violence variables and overlay the variation in these variables with shifts in United States preferences for the Salvadoran government to test this argument.