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This paper explores the relationship between internal armed conflict and durable democracy. It reverses the old IR question about whether democracies make war and asks whether wars “make” democracies. Careful scholars have shown how a recent history of internal wars harms the prospects for lasting democracy. Other, equally careful scholars, have shown how a recent history of war may be helpful to democratization instead. Reconciling these mixed findings, I show how the “durability advantage” depends on the nature of the war itself. Some armed conflicts leave institutional legacies that are harmful to new democracies while others leave legacies that are helpful instead. The outcome largely depends on whether internal conflicts are revolutionary or identity based. Using Cox Proportional Hazards models and an original dataset on every new democracy formed since 1946, I show that new democracies that emerge from revolutionary wars have a durability advantage and that democracies that emerge in the absence of militarized armed struggle do not. Case studies from three different decades and three different regions enable me to explain how and why.