Political Connections and State Access: Experimental Evidence from Senegal

• In Event: Linkages of the State: Brokers, Citizen Observers, and Political Connections

Abstract

An implicit assumption in research on the role of personal and political connections is that such connections actually result in better access to state institutions. This claim is at the heart of theories of personalistic rule, clientelism, and corruption that argue that connections to those in power can increase personal benefit while exacerbating an inefficient institutional system. These connections are thought to be particularly valuable in business contexts where preferential access to political institutions leads to favorable economic outcomes. I directly test this relationship in a real business environment by implementing a field experiment in Senegal in which employees---hired by a business that I created in Dakar---signal their personal and political connections to bureaucratic organizations while applying for valuable business permits. Do such connections decrease the red tape required to obtain permits, and if so, which types of connections are most useful? I present evidence from the field experiment that calls into question key existing assumptions underpinning the dynamics of clientelism.

Author

• Abhit Bhandari, Temple University