Putin’s Prosecutors: How Judiciaries Enable Creeping Authoritarianism

• In Event: Creeping Authoritarianism: How Would-Be Autocrats Subvert Democracy

Abstract

How did Putin use reshuffling within the judiciary (especially, within the Procuracy) to entrench himself in office? More broadly, how does reorientation of loyalties of personnel in the judiciaries contribute to democratic backsliding? This project examines the micro-foundations of democratic erosion and authoritarian state building focusing on the strategic management of personnel of the judiciaries on the subnational level. Existing scholarship has demonstrated ways in which agent shuffling can help authoritarian incumbents get reelected. The study builds on scholarship in this area and shows that agent shuffling in the judiciaries can help build core authoritarian institutions, such as a dominant authoritarian party, while simultaneously unraveling the existing democratic institutions, such as federalism, by making the judiciary independent from local elites. To test this theory, the project relies on an original biographical dataset tracking personnel changes in Russian Procuracy on the subnational level.

Author

• Evgenia Olimpieva, University of Chicago