A Deepening/Widening Tradeoff? Evidence from the GATT and WTO

• In Event: Trade Agreements, Negotiations, and Institutional Design (Pre-Recorded)

Abstract

Due to their consensus practice, this paper proposes that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO), have experienced a deepening/widening tradeoff: as their membership increased (greater width), their effectiveness in promoting trade between members/participants declined (lesser de facto depth). This proposition is tested using gravity models of bilateral trade and two different datasets, first separating the GATT and WTO, which are usually combined into a single membership/participation variable, and then adding a width variable corresponding to each institution. The results show that both trade regimes were the deepest, or the most effective, when they had the fewest member-states and their effectiveness declined, eventually becoming statistically insignificant, as more countries joined. As a quantitative case study, this paper provides some of the first evidence consistent with a tradeoff between depth and width within international regimes.

Authors

• David H. Bearce, University of Colorado, Boulder

• Cody D. Eldredge, Oakland University