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Declarations that certain categories of goods are “contraband,” and therefore liable to search and seizure, are a major mechanism whereby interstate wars disrupt international trade. There is large variation, however, in which goods states declare to be contraband. Why? The conventional wisdom for why, when, and how states regulate wartime trade emphasize that contraband decisions are driven primarily, if not exclusively, by strategic, geopolitical concerns. Arguments over wartime commercial policy, however, often activate a variety of protestations and political behavior by both domestic and transnational economic actors, such as businesses, business leaders, and industry organizations. In this paper I therefore argue that businesses and other domestic economic actors can affect contraband decisions and wartime trade policy. Even if they can’t necessarily prevent a particular good from being declared contraband or not, they can affect the timing of contraband decisions and extract significant compensation from governments to mitigate the effects of these decisions. I illustrate this argument using archival and primary source evidence regarding Great Britain’s decision to declare raw cotton contraband during World War I.