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We examine how fiscal legibility, the ability of a central government to observe local economic conditions for the purposes of taxation, shapes the state's centralization of power in the periphery. When a ruler is unable to observe economic conditions in a district, it can be preferable to grant autonomy and revenue to local intermediaries in charge of tax collection to encourage better performance. As a central ruler's ability to observe local conditions improves, so does the monitoring and accurate sanctioning of underperforming intermediaries, which enables the ruler to tighten control over tax collection, retain more revenue, and establish a more direct state presence in outlaying rural areas. We adapt existing principal-agent models to illustrate this argument, and provide empirical support for the theory using evidence from colonial Mexico around the time of a technological innovation that drastically improved the Crown's ability to observe local production: the introduction of the patio process to refine silver. Using subnational panel data on local political institutions and a difference-in-differences empirical strategy, we show that the establishment of direct rule increased in mining districts following this technological innovation and that this effect was amplified in areas where prior information about the local economy would have been limited.