Evaluating Partisan Gerrymandering Under VRA Constraints

• In Event: Race, Voter Suppression, and Institutions’ Impact on Voters and Outcomes

Abstract

Researchers are increasingly using automated redistricting algorithms to detect and measure gerrymandering. While these algorithms present a promising method for identifying bias due to gerrymandering, they often build unrealistic districts that fail to consider minority representation and compliance with the Voting Rights Act (VRA). As a result, researchers using these algorithms tend to conflate partisan intent with VRA compliance. To address this limitation, we use a redistricting algorithm that takes minority representation into account and produces maps that would satisfy Section 2 of the VRA. We then use this more sophisticated algorithm to evaluate the effect of gerrymandering, independent of the intent to comply with the Act.

Authors

• David Cottrell, University of Georgia

• Jowei Chen, University of Michigan