Democratizing Disarmament: Weapons Governance by Small States

• In Event: Arms and Profit

Abstract

Why do small states pursue multilateral agreements to ban weapons? What do such agreements achieve without the support of powerful states? This paper develops a theory of why small states pursue multilateral weapons governance without the support of powerful states and tests it through the case of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It proposes that small states use multilateral weapons governance agreements to rewrite relations between states and exercise greater influence in world politics, beyond the technical content of the agreement. In doing so, small states challenge powerful states’ privileged positions, provoking a renewed effort from powerful states to retain their dominance. This paper uses elite interviews conducted with diplomats, international bureaucrats, and members of civil society in Geneva, Switzerland to test this theory with the case of 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The findings of this paper suggest that a lack of leadership from the United States and other powerful states on weapons governance can be filled by states seeking to advance divergent goals that challenge the status quo.

Author

• Naomi Egel, Cornell University